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Adapting to Strategic Change

Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times
Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk

Abstract: Force reductions resulting from the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review significantly compromise the US Army’s ability
to maintain the global commitments and positioning necessary for
managing strategic risks arising from multiple, unforeseen sources.
In this article, the authors discuss how active duty Army capacity
affects America’s strategic risk.

D

uring the upcoming decade, the United States will be
challenged by a new strategic threat or worse, multiple strategic
threats. How will the US Army respond if sequestration cuts
continue? The near-future Army—for better or worse—will originate in
this decade. The size and readiness of the near-future Army will offer
one of two options, either reducing America’s strategic risk or increasing
it. So what would be the right size of the Army if we want to reduce
America’s strategic risk?
The results of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) led to
reducing the size of the Army to levels unseen since before World
War II. Unfortunately, the current force reduction can only produce one
result, the weakening of the joint force’s ability to deter conflict, which
accordingly increases America’s strategic risk.
Since the publication of the 2014 QDR, numerous new threats
have emerged to challenge the Army’s reductions. Daesh captured large
parts of Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Civil War escalated, causing a Middle
East and European refugee crisis. Russia annexed Crimea, invaded
Ukraine, and intervened alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps to maintain the Assad regime in Syria. North Korea remained
bellicose, testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China continued its territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and the Taliban
continued to intensify offensive operations in Afghanistan. All of
these events occurred in just the last several years; what might the next
few years bring?
While acknowledging the indispensable roles of both the Army
Reserve and Army National Guard as strategic reserves, their roles,
missions, and sizing are beyond the scope and length of this article, which
focuses on the size of the active duty Army. This discussion considers
what the Army “brings to the fight” in relation to forward presence and
deployable capabilities, the current and future demand on land forces,
and examines two options for rightsizing the Army to reduce strategic
risk. To set the stage for Army force sizing, we discuss the definition of
strategic risk and five troubling assumptions about future war.
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Strategic Risk

How does strategic risk relate to the size of the current and future
US Army? Strategic risk is the probability of failure to achieve a strategic
objective at an acceptable cost. The smaller the army, the higher the risk
of failure to obtain a strategic objective at an acceptable cost.1 Senior US
Army leaders view today’s Army at “high risk” in regards to the emerging
threats and potential for future great-power conflict. High risk is the
rating in which the Army would not be able to accomplish all its assigned
tasks in the allotted time and level of casualties.2

Five Faulty Assumptions

While assessments of strategic risk, acceptable cost, and the size of
the Army are complex, several false assumptions about future war and
landpower have gained currency in defense circles. These assumptions
increase national strategic risk by failing to appreciate Army capacity—
capability with sufficient scale and endurance—as an essential element
of national security. The risk is troubling because it threatens to consign
the US military to a repetition of the mistakes of recent wars and the
development of joint forces ill-prepared for future threats.

Forward-positioned land forces do not prevent conflict.

Deterrence depends on the demonstrated ability to prevent the
enemy from accomplishing its objectives, and deterrence theory states
deterring aggression is most likely to succeed when the potential
aggressor believes the threats will be enacted.3 Joint forces must operate
with sufficient numbers and logistics to win, otherwise adversaries may
become bolder and the effectiveness of forward deployed US Army
forces to deter conflict, even with limited objectives, fails. The forward
positioning of Army forces elevates the cost to an unacceptable level for
the aggressor.
In 1990, some 213,000 soldiers assigned to US Army Europe
contributed greatly to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s)
deterrence efforts and lowering strategic risk.4 With the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however, Army forces were reduced in Europe. In
2002, US Army Europe still offered a large, potent deterrent force that
consisted of a corps headquarters, two heavy divisions, six combat
brigades, and their supporting forces totaling about 70,000 troops.5
Since 2008, US Army Europe has been cut to one Stryker brigade
combat team and one light infantry brigade totaling 28,000 troops. This
1     James F. Holcomb, “Managing Strategic Risk,” in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security
Policy and Strategy, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, July 2004), 119.
2     Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Posture of the Department of the Army in Review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017 and the Future Years Defense Program, Before the US Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 114th Cong., 23 (April 7, 2016) (statement of General Mark Milley, Chief
of Staff, US Army), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/16-40_4-07-16.pdf.
3     James D. Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions 28, no. 1 (2002):
6, doi:10.1080/03050620210390.
4     At the time, US Army Europe divisions included the 1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade
2nd Armored Division, and the 3rd Armored Division, as well as the 1st, 3rd, and 8th Infantry
Divisions (Mech), and the 2nd and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments. See Vincent H. Demma,
“Force Structure,” chap. 7 in Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington,
DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1988), 64.
5     Timothy M. Bonds, Michael Johnson, and Paul S. Steinberg, Limiting Regret, Building the Army
We Will Need (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 9.
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substantial reduction in US Army posture in Europe has resulted in
increased strategic risk with regard to the ability of the United States and
its allies to deter and to help US allies resist Russian aggression.
If deterring threats from offshore or across extended distance fails,
retaliation or reaction can be insufficient because adversaries achieve
rapid, low-cost objectives prior to US or allied response. Deterrence in
Europe during the Cold War depended, in large measure, on the effects
of a globally responsive and forward positioned joint force that included
land forces capable of operating in sufficient size. Today the Army grapples
with how to return to Europe to counter the latest Russian efforts in the
Ukraine and to protect the Baltic nations.

The Army can rapidly generate required ground forces.

Generating ground forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2001 to 2010 proved to be an
extraordinarily difficult, long, and costly endeavor.6 Different from the
Army of the 1940s to 1960s, the all-volunteer Army of today and tomorrow
requires personnel operating sophisticated modern weapons and communications equipment in complex missions, which in turn requires
substantial and extended training, focused education, and established
unit cohesion that takes years to build and to refine. One such example
of this lesson drawn from OEF and OIF is that building an armor
brigade combat team required a minimum of 32 months.7
Force structure decisions made in fiscally constrained environments
today may be impossible to augment in a timely manner if they are
based on flawed strategic assumptions. Decision-makers must maintain
enough military power to handle all contingencies, even those involving
major ground forces.

Future conflicts will not require significant landpower.

Many defense professionals significantly underestimated the ground
force requirement for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after September
11, 2001. Historically, landpower has been required to resolve a wide
range of crises. Nothing indicates the pattern will change in this decade
or the next. All major US operations—World War I, World War II, the
Korean War, Vietnam, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
in Iraq—demonstrated significant ground forces are required not only
to conduct major combat operations but also to consolidate gains and
to sustain favorable outcomes. A total Army force of 297,000 personnel
was deployed to Southwest Asia during Desert Storm. The main attacking force, VII Corps, included the 1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade
Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Division, 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized), 2nd Armored Division (Forward), 1st Cavalry
Division (Detached), 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 11th Aviation Brigade, and
four brigades of the VII Corps Artillery.8 If the drawdown continues,
the loss of capability to produce another contingency response on this

6     Bonds, Johnson, and Steinberg, “Limiting Regret,” 16.
7     “Army Structure Memorandum—October 2015,” Global Security, April 4, 2016, http://www
.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/asm-2015.htm.
8     Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (unofficial), April 1992, 285.
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level will increase strategic risk. Significant land forces will be required
to win or engage in great power conflicts.

Enemy forces can be defeated through precision strikes or raids.

Human will and political aspects of war require landpower to
achieve victory and sustainable outcomes. The enemy’s will to fight is
ultimately broken on the ground. Many thought that the March–August
2011 air campaign against Libya, for example, would yield far better
political results than the chaotic situation in that country today. The
campaign applied airpower to support indigenous forces, as in
Afghanistan, while accepting continued turmoil in the country and the
proliferation of weapons in the region as acceptable risks or outcomes
too difficult or expensive to prevent with our own ground commitment.

Allies and partners can provide capable land forces.

Although advising and assisting other armies will continue to be
an important mission, partners often lack the will or the capability
to fight consistently for US interests; for example, in Afghanistan
from 2004 to 2009, our allies planned troop reductions even as the
Taliban gained control of territory and populations. Another significant
factor is the landpower reductions of our longtime European allies. The
French army has been reduced to less than 135,000 soldiers and the
British army is even smaller; therefore, reliance on traditional allies to
augment US landpower or advance American interests appears to be
rapidly disappearing.
In future conflicts, strategic objectives may be of lesser value to
coalition partners and indigenous allies than they are to the United
States. Consequently, other nations may be less willing to contribute the
land forces that future missions require; ergo US leadership may have
to demonstrate commitment through the deployment of land forces
to move others to action, which was clearly the case in Desert Storm
and Desert Shield. Our ability to help others in a region solve their
own problems will often be contingent on our ability and willingness
to deploy landpower. Though ground commitments are often costly,
an early deployment of sizeable, professional, American land forces can
control a situation before it spirals out of control as well as preserve our
interests and allow others to take over long-term constabulary roles. The
key question for American decision-makers is how much chaos are they
willing to accept in the world, and where. If stability in a tumultuous
region is deemed vital to our national interest, it will not be achieved
with long-range strikes.

The 490,000 Army

An Army of 490,000 troops is a powerful force that is partly
committed, partly deployable, and partly a generating force. The following section discusses what this force can and cannot do for current
and future missions based on capacity, capabilities, and strategic risk.

Forward Deployed—186,000 Soldiers

The Army currently has 186,000 soldiers (38 percent of the total
force) meeting global commitments and reducing strategic risk in more
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than 140 countries.9 In the European Theater of Operations, a rotational
force of over 2,800 soldiers will augment approximately 30,000 soldiers
in the mission of reducing strategic risk through forward presence
and deterrence by 2017.10 These forces assure allies of our continued
NATO commitment and counter Russian operations that include the
use of conventional and unconventional military capabilities to assert
power and accomplish objectives below the normal threshold of war.
In Asia, 80,000 soldiers support US Pacific Command, including 16,412
soldiers on the Korean peninsula who are critical to deterring North
Korea—a dangerous and unpredictable nation that is expanding its
nuclear arsenal and improving its ballistic missile force to complement
a large conventional force.11
In addition to deterrence, soldiers deployed throughout the world
lower strategic risk with other missions such as building relationships
based on common interests, ensuring interoperability, and developing
an enhanced understanding of the environment. These activities not
only reduce threats of transnational terrorism and organized crime but
also instill and reinforce leadership and civil-military relations norms
with our partners.
Since armies are the dominant service in most allied and partner
nations, combatant commanders—field commanders responsible to
the president and secretary of defense for achieving national security
objectives—look to the US Army to execute security force assistance
and theater security cooperation activities. In fiscal year 2013 alone, the
Army conducted nearly 6,000 security cooperation events.12 US presence conveys a guarantee to support our allies if they are threatened and
significantly diminishes concerns about regional security competition
and armed conflict.
Forward-positioned and rotational Army forces not only demonstrate US resolve, they also provide unique land force capabilities to the
joint force. As the executive agent for 42 other Department of Defense
components, the Army supplies critical communications, intelligence,
rotary wing aviation, theater missile defense, logistics, and engineering
capabilities and support equal to all the other assigned component agents
combined. The secretary of defense and combatant commanders rely
on these irreplaceable Army capabilities; for example, highly deployable
Patriot missile units that assure allies, deter adversaries, and represent
a key component of regional defense plans. In 2016, over 50 percent of
the Army’s air and missile defense force was either forward assigned or

9     Current State of Readiness of the U.S. Forces in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2017 and the Future Years Defense Program, Before the US Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee
on Readiness and Management Support, 114th Cong. 1 (March 15, 2016) (statement of General Daniel
Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army).
10     Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Headquarters, “US Army Europe by the Numbers,”
US Army Europe, October 3, 2014, http://www.eur.army.mil/pdf/USAREURBytheNumbers.pdf.
11     Ibid.
12     Colonel John Evans, Getting It Right: Determining the Optimal Active Component End Strength of
the All-Volunteer Army to Meet the Demands of the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
June 2015), 14.
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deployed.13 This high percentage demonstrates the growing demand for
these and other Army capabilities.
The 186,000 forces that are committed are proving the difficulty of
disengaging forces once soldiers are committed to a national security
mission. At the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Army forces
remained committed in Europe, Korea, the Balkans, the Sinai Peninsula,
Japan, and the Philippines, as well as Central, North, and South America.
The size of the Army, therefore, must not only allow our nation to sustain
committed forces but also expand for unexpected operations.

Deployable—148,000 Soldiers

Combatant commanders require land forces prepared to respond
globally; the Army currently has a deployable force of 148,000 soldiers
(30 percent of the total force) that plays this pivotal role in joint force
operations.14 Although long-range strike and offshore capabilities will
remain important to joint force deterrence, deployable land forces will
be critical to joint force planning and operations if deterrence fails. The
demands on rotational forces affect the active Army because, in essence,
three rotational land forces must be maintained in sufficient scale and
capability to meet current and future commitments, to operate for the
duration of war plans, to respond to unfolding contingency missions,
and to allow units to refit at a home station.15

Generating Force—156,000 Soldiers

Trainers, educators, and students primarily compose the generating
force of 156,000 soldiers (32 percent of the total force) whose capacity
ensures the readiness of Army forces to sustain commitments overseas
as well as expand forces to win in combat, respond to crises, and fulfill
combatant command commitments. One of the most important roles
for the 93,000 person training force, training and leader development,
provides the foundation for today’s all-volunteer professional Army
and maintains the Army’s competitive advantage over future enemies.16
Members of other services, our allies, and international military partners
are trained and educated with the remaining 63,000 soldiers in the
generating force; for example, all US Marine Corps tankers and field
artillerymen complete Army training.17
Because the size of the generating force, as well as the entire active
duty Army, has a critical effect on the Army’s ability to mobilize and
expand in wartime, reductions in the generating force directly impact
intervention and expansion capacity risks. These factors in turn impact
13     Ballistic Missile Defense Programs in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017
and the Future Years Defense Program Hearings, Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services Strategic
Forces Subcommittee, 114th Cong. 16 (April 13, 2016) (statement of LTG David L. Mann, Commanding
General of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command).
14     Bonds, Johnson, and Steinberg, “Limiting Regret,” 4.
15     The US Army currently rotates soldiers on a 1:2 deployment ratio, which equates to a ninemonth deployment followed by 18 months at a home station. This ratio requires a rotational force of
120,000 troops to keep 40,000 troops deployed in the field—40,000 conducting operations, 40,000
returning from operations, and 40,000 preparing to conduct operations. Decisions on Army capacity,
therefore, must consider what it takes to sustain these commitments and readiness over time.
16     Evans, “Getting It Right,” 16.
17     The training pipeline includes trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS). See Bonds,
Johnson, and Steinberg, “Limiting Regret,” 4.
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the joint force’s ability to deter conflict, lower strategic risk, and fight
and win against increasingly capable enemies when required.

Increasing Demand, Historical and Future

In predicting the Army’s future size, planners have never correctly
forecast the character or scale of anticipated conflicts nor the demands
of other missions. Across the last three decades, US leaders committed
land forces to at least 50 named operations, many with little or no notice,
which included a wide range of missions:
•• Invasions to defeat enemy militaries and unseat hostile regimes in
Panama (1989), Haiti (1994), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003)
•• Humanitarian interventions in Bosnia (1993), Somalia (1993), and
Kosovo (1999)
•• Response to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2005), the
Haiti earthquake (2010), and Superstorm Sandy (2012)
•• Restoration of the territorial integrity of an occupied nation (Operation
Desert Storm 1991)
Additionally, between September 2001 and December 2012,
the Army provided 1.65 million cumulative troop-years to overseas
operations in support of OEF and OIF, more than the other services combined.18 Those conflicts, which were not large by historical
standards, stressed the Army’s ability to meet commitments and demonstrated that landpower requires forces for both quick response and
long-lasting operations. With this requirement in mind and the plan to
cut personnel to 450,000 soldiers, the joint force will be unable to surge
forces to fight another Operation Desert Shield or conduct operations
on the scale of Operation Desert Storm without accepting significant
risk in other theaters.
Since World War II, history reveals the need to retain not only the
ability to intervene with land forces at the outset of a conflict but to also
expand forces to sustain efforts. Both capabilities are critical to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and during the consolidation
period that follows. Post-World War II reductions saw the Army go from
eight million soldiers and 89 divisions in 1945 to 591,000 soldiers and
10 divisions by 1950—a 93 percent reduction in manpower over five
years.19 This drastic reduction was based on the pre-Korean War theory
that the offset capability of atomic weapons would prevent a large-scale
land conflict. Yet, after North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June
1950, the 8th Army in Korea grew by over 300,000 personnel. Many US
units were unprepared for the demands of combat and casualties were
high.20 The situation grew so grim at one point that it was not clear if
South Korea could keep its toehold on the peninsula.
Despite this record, the United States continued to undervalue the
need for ready land forces in interwar years. Since the Korean War, the
18     Caolionn O’Connell, Jennie W. Wenger, and Michael L. Hansen, Measuring and Retaining the
U.S. Army’s Deployment Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), 1.
19     Andrew Feickert, Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), 5.
20     Donald W. Boose, US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–53 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2005), 5.
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complexity of weapon systems and combined arms operations have
hindered the rapid generation of forces and increased the risk to soldiers
who were required to fight without proper training or skilled leaders.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 demonstrates how quickly a major
problem cannot be solved by anything other than a significant ground
force. Moreover, an overview of the VII Corps Desert Storm battle plan
illustrates the complexity of weapons, combined arms, and leadership
used during the conflict.
The ground campaign plan envisioned a main attack against the
Iraqi Army’s right flank by armor-heavy forces to attack one of Saddam
Hussein’s centers of gravity—the Republican Guard armored and
mechanized divisions. Crucial factors in the success of the ground campaign were overwhelming combat power, rapid maneuver, deception, a
sound combined arms approach, a well-trained, highly motivated body
of troops, and a skilled team of combat leaders.21 This action would not
have been possible if the Army needed 32 months to create an armor
brigade combat team or additional units for a long-term response.
Our most recent military experience highlights the need for the US
government to maintain ready joint forces capable of operating in sufficient scale and duration to accomplish its missions. Prior to September
2001, the Department of Defense planned significant reductions in the
Army, erroneously believing that the next war would be fought mainly
with long-range precision weapons. This error had consequences.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the active Army grew
from 476,289 to 570,000 soldiers. The US Army’s requirement to
sustain other NATO commitments overseas in areas such as Europe,
Japan, and Korea; remain prepared for unforeseen contingencies; and
sustain an Army capable of manning, training, and equipping the force
compounded the challenge of this extraordinarily difficult expansion.
Demands on the Army’s capabilities are increasing. Strategic risk is
not declining. With the rise of multiple near-peer adversaries and regional
hegemons, a smaller Army may only encourage adventurism. Recent
world events have invalidated the force reduction plans of only three years
ago, resulting in the demand for land forces to increase, not decrease as
postulated. Since the 2013 Department of Defense Strategic Choices and
Management Review and the National Defense Panel review calling for
Army force reductions the world chose another path. Instead of a peaceful
Europe, a diminishing commitment in Afghanistan, and no US forces
returning to Iraq, the world went into unforeseen conflict. Russia
invaded Crimea and Ukraine, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
established a protostate in Syria and Iraq, Yemen collapsed, and the
security environment in Africa and the Middle East worsened.
Instead of drawing down the 7,200 Army forces in Afghanistan
in 2017 as originally planned, they will be maintained. Over 5,000
soldiers are now in Kuwait and Iraq to sustain the campaign against the
Islamic State.22 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced on July
21     Final Report to Congress, 123.
22     Jon Harper, “1,000 Soldiers from 82nd Airborne Headed to Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, December
19, 2014; David Burge, “3rd Brigade from Fort Bliss to Deploy,” Army Times, March 15, 2016; and
Kristina Wong, “Army Sending 450 Troops to Kuwait in Fight Against ISIS,” The Hill, August 5,
2015.
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11, 2016 that an additional 560 troops will deploy to Iraq.23 Discussions
to increase Army forces in Europe by the addition of another rotational
or permanent brigade are ongoing, and the Army is seeking to expand
the Pacific Pathways mission for the Guard and Reserve.24
These increasing commitments overseas and reductions in the size
of the Army have significantly decreased the pool of land forces available
to decision-makers, in turn limiting options and increasing strategic risk.
Because the location, scale, and duration of future conflicts are impossible to predict, calculating intervention and expansion capacity requires
intellectual rigor, outstanding judgment, and humility about how much
we know.
The one undeniable pattern for the future is that crises will
materialize quickly, blindside the best defense forecasters, and demand
a land-force response. Analysis informed by studies of emerging threats,
joint force mission possibilities, historical insights, and the technological impacts on the character of future war all lead to the conclusion
that mounting strategic risk is associated with reduced Army capacity.
Accordingly, what options are available for limiting our strategic risk?

Rightsizing the Army

Like the defense planners, Army leadership is working toward
informed decisions about rightsizing the Army. Recently, senior Army
leaders found that operating under current National Security Strategy
and defense planning guidance, an approximately 1.2 million person
Army would be necessary to reduce significant risk.
As a short-term option, policymakers could stop the drawdown at
the current force level, 490,000 soldiers, until existing strategic threats
are fully analyzed and addressed. In the short term, the overseas contingency operations funding could be used until a permanent funding
option is obtained.25 While the Army’s analysis to determine the
optimum increase for the future is ongoing, at 490,000 troops the Army
is potentially headed toward dangerously low levels of capabilities and
will have difficulty meeting foreseeable challenges. Experience suggests
the most obvious threats are not always the most likely. Precisely because
planning occurs for foreseeable threats, we have an even smaller margin
available to meet unforeseeable challenges; these may be more demanding
and become much more problematic with a one campaign Army.26

Conclusion

Even the deep force cuts that reduced Army forces from 572,000
to 479,000 by the end of the Clinton administration as a result of the
Bottom-Up Review in 1993 were less than current proposals.27 The
Soviet Union had collapsed, terrorist threats to the homeland were not
23     Michael S. Schmidt and Mark Landler, “U.S. Will Deploy 560 More Troops to Iraq to Help
Retake Mosul from ISIS,” New York Times, July 11, 2016.
24     Andrew Tilghman, “More U.S. Troops Deploying to Europe in 2017,” Military Times,
February 2, 2016.
25     Bonds, Johnson, and Steinberg, “Limiting Regret,” 19.
26     Ibid.
27     US Department of Defense (DoD), Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: DoD,
1993).
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apparent, and North Korea did not have nuclear weapons; therefore,
the cuts seemed reasonable. In our increasingly interconnected world,
however, Army forces must be prepared to respond to both overseas
contingencies and threats to the homeland. Accordingly, the Army must
develop and sustain ready forces capable of defeating our enemies and
accomplishing missions under all conditions of combat. To accomplish
assigned missions while confronting increasingly dangerous threats in
complex operational environments, some military experts argue that the
Army must possess both capability and capacity, which would require a
force increase by well over 100,000 soldiers. Although further internal
assessment is essential, wide-ranging external analysis supports this
position.28
As leaders consider the appropriate size of America’s land forces,
they should understand the challenges of today’s increasingly dangerous
and rapidly changing security environment require greater landpower
capacity. This point is underscored by the Army’s current commitments
and foundational role within the Joint Force, the value of surge capacity,
and the investment required to generate, mobilize, and expand Army
forces. Likewise, widely held, yet flawed, assumptions that mask risks
associated with a smaller Army should be discarded. A capable Army
of sufficient capacity is a prudent investment to protect our nation’s
interests, to defend our homeland, and to mitigate risk.
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